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ABSTRACT: This paper will examine chronically derailed church-state separation arguments in order to 
explore the extent to which rhetorical and dialectical approaches can be reconciled. I will consider broader 
conceptions of rhetoric than those employed to date in studies of strategic manoeuvring. While rhetorical 
appeals, such as claims of persecution, can terminally polarize church-state arguments, they may also serve 
as means for recovering from dialectical derailment. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Studies of strategic manoeuvring within the pragma-dialectical approach have assisted 
the empirical and theoretical development of argumentation as a field. By focusing on 
ostensibly rhetorical moves in arguments, research has yielded ever more accurate 
descriptions of argumentative discourse and has produced ever more nuanced theoretical 
models of argumentation, answering in part the ongoing project identified by van 
Eemeren and Houtlosser (2003, p. 399) to identify the “characteristics of argumentative 
discourse.” These advances in argumentation theory, however, come at the cost of 
reducing the reducing the complexity of rhetorical theory, so that rhetorical moves can 
operate within the pragma-dialectical rules for critical discussion. 
 I do not intend to object to such a reduction per se. Any methodological decision 
entails selecting certain philosophical assumptions and theoretical frameworks over 
others in the pursuit of a coherent and productive model for understanding discourse. 
Preferring a rhetorical model means foregoing elements of a dialectical model and vice 
versa. I do intend, however, to investigate how far these two models can be reconciled. 
From a broader perspective on suasive discourse, it seems that both dialectical and 
rhetorical models offer insights into reasonable and persuasive communicative 
interaction. One potentially fruitful place to pursue the intersections of rhetoric and 
dialectic is in the study of derailment—wherein rhetorical moves threaten to disrupt the 
dialectical progression of an argument. Investigations of strategic manoeuvring have 
described arguments wherein attempts by one interlocutor to “win” an argument can still 
operate in an inter-subjectively valid manner (van Eemeren & Houtlosser 2006; Zarefsky 
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2006). However, research has not investigated in as much detail rhetorical moves that 
derail arguments and how arguments can recover from derailment. 
In the sections that follow, this paper will press on the theoretical boundaries 
between rhetorical and dialectical models. First, it will review and engage theoretical 
conceptions of rhetoric used in recent argumentation scholarship. Second, it will propose 
an alternative conceptualization of rhetoric drawing on classical sophistic traditions that 
can expand theoretical models for examining instances of argument in which derailment 
occurs. In examining rhetorical moves that occur outside of the forms of strategic 
maneuvering as described in the pragma-dialectical framework, we can see how rhetoric 
functions to both derail arguments and lay the discursive groundwork necessary for 
recovery from derailment. The paper will close with an analysis of a particularly heated 
area of cultural conflict: disputes over the proper relationship between religion and the 
state. 
 
2. STRATEGIC MANUEVERING: LOCATING THE RHETORICAL IN DIALECTIC 
 
Van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2002, pp. 134-5) describe strategic manoeuvring as a 
means of resolving the tension between an interlocutor's obligation to the rules of critical 
discussion (i.e. the dialectical aspect of discourse) and his or her desire to win an 
argument in his or her own favour (i.e. the rhetorical aspect of discourse). Insofar as 
argumentative moves seek to resolve disagreement in favour of one interlocutor while 
also obeying the rules for critical discussion they are to be considered strategic 
manoeuvring. Interlocutors will forward viewpoints that attempt to put their own position 
in the best light possible, and, so long as such viewpoints remain open to challenge by all 
other interlocutors, the argument remains dialectically acceptable. Should self-interested 
moves violate the rules of critical discussion, they derail arguments and prevent 
dialectically acceptable resolution of disagreement. Van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2002) 
add two points of qualification to this description of strategic manoeuvring: First, they 
emphasize that they do not intend a simplistic equation of rhetoric with winning at any 
cost, but they do believe that rhetoric is “in the end always, and undeniably, associated 
with getting your point as intended across to an audience” (p. 135). Second, they 
acknowledge that they are “integrating rhetorical insight into a dialectical framework, 
instead of the other way around, because [their] primary interest” is the pragma-
dialectical model for critical discussion (p. 135). 
 To deal with the points in reverse order: I am not interested here in simply 
switching the methodology privileged (to use a rhetorical framework instead of a 
dialectical framework). I wish to investigate the boundaries of each method, their 
potential compatibilities and, where incompatible, what each can reveal about the wider 
realm of persuasive discourse. Van Eemeren and Houtlosser's (2002) other point, that of 
rhetoric's distinguishing characteristic being the transmission of a point from a rhetor to 
an audience, raises important questions about rhetoric's definition that are not easily 
answered, either in a short paper or in the millennia-old history of rhetorical studies. Yet, 
the question of definition is worth pursuing lest relevant alternate conceptions of rhetoric 
go unconsidered thereby overlooking productive models of discourse. Some alternatives 
will be considered in the next section, but first I will describe the boundaries of rhetoric 
as it has been defined in argumentation scholarship. 
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 Definitions of rhetoric used in argumentation studies tend to parallel the historical 
tradition to remove rhetoric from any role in the process of generating and exchanging 
viewpoints and to define it narrowly as a symbolic activity concerned with the unilateral 
communication of information from a rhetor to an audience. This definition has 
antecedents in classical debates over the nature of rhetoric, such as the argument voiced 
by Plato's (1987) Socrates in the Gorgias that rhetoric is an art of appealing to appetites 
and appearances quite distinct from a dialectical process of reasoning that uncovers 
substance and truth. As Kennedy (1999, pp. 249-51) discusses, Pierre de la Ramee (Peter 
Ramus) solidified this approach for medieval and early modern rhetoric, defining rhetoric 
purely as stylistic. These approaches to rhetoric, having separated style from the process 
of rational thought, assign to rhetoric the role of applying enticing features to the ideas 
previously generated through dialectic, philosophy or logic so as to communicate ideas 
successfully to an audience. The conceptions of rhetoric at work in argumentation 
scholarship avoid the animosity de la Ramee and Plato’s Socrates display for the art, but 
they nevertheless reflect the historical tendency to separate rhetoric from multilateral 
processes of reasoning and leave it responsible for unilateral stylistic and transmissive 
functions. 
 It is on this unilateral function of transmission that I wish to focus. Dialectical 
approaches to argument examine the interchange between two or more interlocutors, 
describing a discrete back-and-forth process of viewpoint expression, challenge and 
defense. Under this approach, rhetoric is described as an activity undertaken by one 
interlocutor to modify the appearance of his viewpoint—an activity that is distinct from 
the activity of generating the viewpoint and defending the viewpoint against challenge, 
and even when rhetoric is given an essential, positive function in generating and 
maintaining good argumentative practice, it is still shown as functioning apart from the 
propositional interchange of dialectic. 
 For instance, Jacobs (2000) describes a nuanced systematic approach to 
argumentation that that situates dialectical argument, rhetoric and normative pragmatics 
inside a framework that assigns distinct-yet-integral roles to each model of linguistic 
analysis. Rhetoric in Jacobs' (2000, p. 281) framework has an important function of 
“plac[ing] people in more open, critical resolution-oriented frames of mind,” and it 
achieves this function through the “strategic design” of various types of “symbolic 
inducements” other than arguments (p. 263). As examples Jacobs (2000) cites visual 
elements added to advertisements that function to imply meaning without stating it 
explicitly in the written text and emotional appeals that function to persuade an audience 
to reconsider viewpoints previously rejected. Rhetoric under this framework is both 
potentially productive for and compatible with dialectically sound argumentation, but it is 
nevertheless distinct from the argumentative process. 
 This distinction sets the audience up as a static set of expectations according to 
which a rhetor constructs and then applies appeals to proposed viewpoints that have 
already arisen out of dialectical interchange. Similar understandings of rhetoric are 
presented by Rescher (1998) and Slob (2002). While both describe a positive role for 
rhetoric in the processes accompanying argumentation, each evince assumptions of 
rhetoric as a unilateral process. For Slob (2002), rhetoric plays an important role in 
maintaining shared standards of reasonableness through a process of mutual testing of 
appeals forwarded by interlocutors. On the surface Slob's (2002) “dialogic rhetoric” 
appears to be more than the unilateral application of style to make a viewpoint appealing 
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to an audience; however, its multilateral nature derives from a dialectical process of 
discrete interchanges between interlocutors and not from a definition of rhetoric itself as 
multilateral. Rescher (1998, p. 316) similarly relies on rhetoric to play a vital role in 
argumentation insofar as it keeps interlocutors engaged in the dialectical testing of ideas, 
but his conception of rhetorical constructs too is ultimately unilateral, relying on 
“intrinsically appealing features” that do not arise through the interaction of propositions. 
The rhetoric represented in Jacobs (2006), Rescher (1998) and Slob (2002) is a symbolic 
activity that does not derive from the interaction of viewpoints but rather conforms to a 
set of expectations. Keeping rhetoric and dialectic separate in this manner affords clear 
theoretical theoretical boundaries for analyzing discourse, but it is not consonant with the 
full range of rhetorical theory available, such as various classical conceptualizations of 
rhetoric in which the rhetor and audience are not easily separated. It is in this unclear 
boundary between rhetor and audience that the symbolic resources of rhetoric are to be 
found. 
 Tindale (1999; 2006) raises important questions about the relationship between 
rhetor and audience by challenging the unidirectional symbolic activity between an active 
rhetor and a passive audience. Because it is as audience to others' viewpoints that we first 
encounter language, Tindale (2006, p. 454) argues, “we always have the standpoint of an 
audience, of what the experience of an audience feels like; this is our primary relationship 
to argumentation, our entry into it.” Tindale encourages analysis of argumentation to 
proceed from the assumption that interlocutors can never not think of themselves as 
audience, but this focus on audience only reverses the unilateral active rhetor/passive 
audience paradigm of other argumentation theorists. The identity of audience member 
may by our primary role in argument insofar as chronologically humans listen to others 
before they talk, but it does not follow that that role remains privileged once we are 
enmeshed in discourse (Tindale, 2006, p. 454). Both the lack of any privileged position—
either audience or rhetor—and the difficulty in attributing the origin of rhetorical 
constructions to any one viewpoint or rhetor are key components of the conceptualization 
of rhetoric this paper defends. 
 
3. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO RHETORIC 
 
This alternative conceptualization of rhetoric can be explored through any number of 
classical philosophers, rhetors and rhetoricians—from Protagoras to Quintilian—who 
were sophists or were influenced by sophistic traditions. By sophistic I mean the 
understanding of rhetoric proposed by Poulakos (1983, p. 36) of rhetoric being an “art 
which seeks to capture in opportune moments that which is appropriate and attempts to 
suggest that which is possible.” In the interests of focusing the comparison of rhetoric and 
dialectic so as to bring out in relief the potential intersections and incompatibilities, I will 
limit this paper to a consideration of Cicero's (trans. 2001) dialogue De Oratore. While 
not a comprehensive catalogue of all potentially useful classical rhetorical models, De 
Oratore does intertwine certain sophistic threads to provide resources for expanding the 
conception of rhetoric considered by argumentation theory. Two elements in Cicero 
(trans. 2001) serve as a starting framework to build an alternative definition of rhetoric: 
the first is rhetoric's expansive, substantive and polyvocal inventive capacity. The second 
is rhetoric's common resources of invention. These resources derive from rhetoric's 
multilateral nature, in which the rhetor is not separate from the audience but both are 
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inextricably bound together in a common rhetorical situation. When read through a 
sophistic lens, these two Ciceronian elements will provide a clear contrast to the approach 
that tends to be portrayed in argumentation scholarship of rhetoric working in a 
unidirectional active-rhetor/passive-audience manner. 
 Cicero (trans. 2001) emphasizes a rhetor's ability to make use of the rhetorical 
resources present in a given moment, which are drawn from “the feelings, the opinions, 
and the hopes of his fellow citizens and of those people whom he wants to persuade” (p. 
112). Cicero's expansive approach to invention, of “endless” routes through which rhetors 
may travel in pursuit of persuasion, exists in tension with the tightly confined progression 
of the dialectical models (Cicero, trans. 2001, p. 107). For example, the pragma-
dialectical approach allows for interlocutors to express any point of view, but it also 
encourages the other interlocutors involved to either accept or reject those viewpoints in 
the dialectical progression to resolution of their disagreement, thus constraining any 
movement toward other possible viewpoints within the immediate acceptance or rejection 
of interlocutors. 
 Cicero (trans. 2001) presents a very different vision than the unilateral application 
of style and audience-constrained appeal offered in argumentation treatments of rhetoric. 
No matter what a rhetor may wish to say, he is inevitably conditioned by the expectations 
of the audience even before he formulates a viewpoint. Unlike the discrete interlocutors 
of the dialectical models, the identities of rhetor and audience in Ciceronian rhetoric are 
not easily separable. Viewpoints expressed in dialectical argument are constrained after 
they are expressed and when challenged by another interlocutor. Viewpoints in rhetorical 
argument are constrained even before they are formulated, as the savvy rhetor must “deal 
with people as they are,” finding arguments and appeals he knows are likely to appeal to 
his audience (Cicero, trans. 2001, p. 181). Unlike the intrinsic appeals in Rescher's (1998) 
definition of rhetoric, the Ciceronian appeals arise out of the contingent relationships 
among the values and commonplaces that are accepted by or are capable of being made 
acceptable to those who share a rhetorical situation. The rhetor not only appeals to widely 
held beliefs, but also combines and rearranges those beliefs to generate a wide-ranging 
supply of appeals—appeals that are not necessarily held as intrinsically appealing by the 
audience before the rhetor performs the work of rearranging them. The rhetorical mindset 
is always inhabiting an unspoken dialogue, considering the range of potential viewpoints 
and appeals in a given context and continually reconfiguring their possible arrangements. 
In a sense, neither the rhetor's nor audience's ideas are their own but are instead an 
inchoate amalgam of each other's. 
 The sophistic rhetorical approach can perhaps be most clearly seen in the 
pedagogical practice of antilogy, in which a rhetor-in-training had to argue multiple sides 
of hypothetical in arguments, not in pitched debates between classmates but in solitary 
written exercises in which one student had to inhabit multiple viewpoints. Mendelson 
(2001 and 2002) provides a detailed description of antilogical practice, and, though he 
seeks to situate antilogy within a contemporary argumentation model, his 
conceptualization of antilogy is consonant with the conceptualization of rhetoric 
defended in this paper. Whether through the practice of antilogy or through an expansive 
and multivocal inventional capacity, sophistic rhetoric does not seem to be compatible 
with dialectical argumentation models that require discrete, identifiable linguistic acts 
exchanged between discrete interlocutors. 
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 For example, I do not deny van Eemeren and Houtlosser's (2002, p. 135) claim 
that rhetoric is “associated with getting your point as intended across to the audience,” 
but I cannot help but consider that, insofar as language and persuasion is social as Tindale 
(2006) notes, one's own point is never truly one's own but emerges from one's enmeshed 
position in the network of social discourse. Cicero emphasizes that if a rhetor is a 
“stranger to the customs of his community,” his attempts at persuasion will fail (Cicero, 
2001, p. 157). Rhetors can only “get across” points that are in some way bridgeable to an 
audience's presuppositions but not necessarily bridgeable in an obvious manner. 
Rhetorical models like the one defended in this paper do not allow for the easy separation 
of interlocutors, linguistic moves and stages of dialectical progression. Similarly, a 
dialectical approach does not provide explanations for the symbolic activity that occurs 
outside of these discrete theoretical categories. In the final section I will suggest potential 
intersections of the rhetorical and dialectical perspective as described in an example 
analysis. 
 
4. DERAILMENT AND RECOVERY IN CHURCH-STATE ARGUMENT 
 
Disputes over the proper relationship between religious institutions and government have 
produced some of the most contentious and sustained disagreements in United States 
political discourse. Disagreements over government sponsorship of religious practice, 
particularly over the teaching of religion in state-run public schools, have been a 
persistent matter of contention since the mid-nineteenth century (Haiman 2003). The 
example considered below is one of many texts written in response to proposals during 
the nineteenth century to eliminate mandatory Bible reading from schools in districts 
across the United States.  
 The argument of Presbyterian minister W. A. Scott (1859) provides an especially 
compelling example to use in consideration of the relationship between rhetoric and 
dialectic, because his argument makes explicit mention of the poor quality of the civic 
discussion on the topic and he responds directly to outrageous accusations that have the 
potential to terminally disrupt debate. While Scott's (1859) argument serves as an 
excellent example of an argument that functions, in despite of serious pressure, to 
maintain open discussion in which all interlocutors are engaged, it also reveals the fine 
line between dialectically acceptable arguments and those that derail. Arguments over 
government endorsement of religion often revolve around an antilogical question of 
threat posed to religion, and it is this question that can serve to both derail and re-rail 
debate, depending on the rhetorical skills of the speaker and the context of the debate. 
 The antilogical claims involved in the debate take the general form of: (A) 
religious liberty depends on the active endorsement of religion by the government, or, (B) 
religious liberty depends on the neutrality of the government. Each side appeals to the 
key value of religious liberty, but the definition of that value is contested. In defending 
their favoured definition, interlocutors often invoke arguments that violate rules for 
critical discussion. Scott (1859) reprints responses to a sermon he gave in defence of 
ending Bible reading that accuse him of acting out of hostility toward Protestant 
Christianity. So heated are the responses, they cannot engage Scott's viewpoints as he 
makes them. In attacking his motives, his critics violate the pragma-dialectical rule that 
forbids an interlocutor from attacking a viewpoint not actually forwarded in discussion 
and misstating an interlocutor's position (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 2004). However, 
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since the interlocutors are all heavily invested in the nebulous concept of religious liberty, 
it is that idea that Scott (1859) keeps as the central term in his response, while also 
explaining how his interlocutors are wrong: 
 
Nor is it true that, by not compelling the reading of the Bible in the Public Schools, the Word of 
God is withheld from children. There is no prohibition to their using the Bible—any Bible they or 
their parents may chose. There is no inquisition into their homes, commanding them not to read 
the Bible [...] It is, then, altogether misstating the points at issue to cry out against the monstrous 
wickedness of violating our Institutions by withholding the Protestant translation of the Scriptures 
from the youth in our Public Shools [sic]. There is no withholding; there is only this: we do not 
wish the Constitution and laws to be violated by doing violence to the consciences of our fellow 
citizens. (pp. 68-9) 
 
Scott's appeal to the threat posed to liberty of conscience operates not only as a 
proposition intended to convince his interlocutors of the rightness of his position but also 
as a way to re-order a stalled discursive movement, though he does so at the risk of 
furthering the alienation of his interlocutors. He re-purposes the dire accusations that he 
is the enemy of religious liberty, suggesting that the true threat to liberty are those who 
seek to use government to support one religious point of view. He does so with the aim of 
creating an appeal to a threat that overwhelms the threat-appeal of his opponents. As 
Scott answers his opponents' charge and makes a claim about the consequences of their 
desired polices, instead of casting aspersion on their motives, his argument adheres more 
closely to the rules for critical discourse than those of his opponents. However, he does 
not simply say that government endorsement of one religious point of view threatens 
liberty. He says it “does violence to the conscience,” and elsewhere in his text pursues 
equally vivid portrayals of the threat to religious liberty as he sees it. These appeals to 
pathos conflict with the requirement that critical discussions avoid appeals to non-
argumentation (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004), but aim to serve another role in 
Scott's attempt at furthering the discussion. 
 Scott is not only responding to his interlocutors to tell them they are wrong (and 
why they are wrong). He is also attempting to reconfigure their understandings of 
religious liberty, threats to that liberty and what arguments and appeals they will find 
persuasive on those topics. This antilogical rhetorical work depends on the ambiguous 
and contingent nature of the terms being discussed. Unlike the acceptance or rejection of 
dialectical argument, antilogy need not have as its immediate goal of persuading another 
to accept a viewpoint. Gagarin (2001, p. 282) suggests that antilogy was not primarily 
used by ancient sophists to persuade audiences but rather to unsettle audience 
expectations about the nature of language and argument. Gagarin's configuration of 
rhetoric matches well Poulakos' (1983) sense of sophistic rhetoric as concerned with the 
possible and Ciceronian rhetoric's concern for a thorough exploration of the potential 
means for persuasion as are found in the arguments and knowledge common to both 
rhetor and audience. The operation of rhetoric can be responsible for disruption of 
dialectical acceptability of an argument, and it cannot guarantee its restoration once 
disrupted. Indeed, Scott did not win over many of his critics. But, once argumentation has 
derailed, rhetoric can provide the means for opening up solidified attitudes through 
appeal to the ambiguity and plurality of opinion existing in a given rhetorical setting. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
 
The rhetorical play of language may be used to persuade, or it may be used to expand the 
notions of the persuasive. This latter function works at a level once-removed from the 
immediate back-and-forth of dialectical conversation, and at that level is not bound by the 
rules for dialectical proper communication, especially the final rule proposed by van 
Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004, pp. 195-6) that viewpoints cannot be “confusingly 
ambiguous.” Rhetoric thrives on the confusingly ambiguous, and the rhetorical activity of 
reworking notions of the possible and the persuasive may be necessary components in the 
larger context of persuasion wherein arguments tend to move swiftly on and off the 
dialectical path to resolution. Rhetoric may be able to illuminate what dialectic cannot 
show us, namely the linguistic activity that takes place when the rules for critical 
discussion are not followed, even if it does not offer models of discrete speech acts due to 
its contingent and nature and reliance on ambiguity.  
 
         Link to commentary 
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